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Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the
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INTRODUCTION

"Bonuses? Big money promises? Uh-uh. Cambria's carrot was the fame
and glory that would come from playing bisbol in the big leagues," wrote
Ray Fitzgerald, reflecting on Washington Senators scout Joe Cambria's tactics
in recruiting Latino baseball talent from the mid-1930s through the 1950s.'
Cambria was the first of many scouts who searched Latin America for
inexpensive recruits for their respective ball clubs. The attraction of Latin
America, of course, was not only the possibility of recruiting cheap talent, but
also the availability of potentially skilled players in regions where labor laws
accommodated Major League Baseball (MLB) owners. Since the 1930s,
thousands of young men signed contracts that contained little more than empty
promises. Little, if any, money was exchanged; and contracts prohibited
players from marketing their talents-the practice of free and competitive
enterprise--elsewhere. Interestingly, MLB techniques in Latin America were
consistent with the business practices of U.S. companies throughout the region
since the late nineteenth century. Professional baseball recruiting in Latin
America embodied many of the features of the neocolonialist tradition.
I. THE NEOCOLONIALIST TRADITION
Though many historians often consider the Spanish American War in
1898 as the genesis of large-scale American foreign capitalism in Latin
America, the United States, like many other Western industrial powers, was
already well-entrenched in this region within and around the periphery of the
Caribbean and Mexico. Foreign investments were heavy in Latin American
* Ph.D., Professor of History, California State University, Stanislaus.
1. Ray Fitzgerald, Uncle Joe-Senators' Cuban Connection, THE SPORTING NEWS, June 21, 1980,
at 17.
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resources, including agriculture, minerals, and petroleum. Foreign capital also
inundated other Latin American industries, such as the railroads and shipping.
Between 1880 and the 1930s, several Latin American leaders, who hoped
to draw revenue into their countries, openly embraced investments from
Western industrial giants. Central American, Caribbean, and Mexican rulers
encouraged large-scale foreign business ventures and created internal policies
to suit the outsiders.2 During the Porfiriato, Mexico accommodated American
and British interests so much that the phrase "Mexico, mother of foreigners
and stepmother of Mexicans" was a popular and an accurate statement of
Mexican circumstances by the end of the nineteenth century.3
Throughout this period, the Latin working class had little influence with
their domestic leaders or foreign employers. Campesinosin the fields endured
long work days, ruthless bosses, and inhumane conditions. Their brethren in
urban industry were no better off. Historian Ramon Eduardo Ruiz observed,
for example, that Mexican industrial workers "spent a good part of their lives
in sweatshops, crowded into unventilated and unheated rooms that hot weather
turned into furnaces and in winter's cold into iceboxes."4 Workers at the
United Fruit Company in Guatemala and other agricultural facilities toiled in
a system that "exacted at least 150 days each year of debt labor 'in lieu of
taxes."' 5 Worker protests about their treatment almost certainly invited
trouble from the companies and government authorities.
American enterprises also penetrated deeply into Cuba and the Dominican
Republic. American capitalists poured substantial resources into major Cuban
agricultural and urban industries;6 and the U.S. government aided such
investments through the-infamous Platt Amendment, which radical leader Juan
Gualberto Gomez argued "reduced the independence and sovereignty of the
Cuban republic to a myth." 7 By 1929, American companies controlled fiftysix percent of all Cuban production. Foreign investment also negatively
2. See BENJAMIN KEEN & MARK WASSERMAN, A HISTORYOF LATIN AMERICA 208-10 (3d ed. 1988).
See also E. BRADFORD BURNS, THE POVERTY OF PROGRESS: LATIN AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 132-33, 138-39 (1980).
3. KEEN & WASSERMAN, supra note 2, at 215. See also RAMON EDUARDO RUIz, THE GREAT
REBELLION: MEXICO, 1905-1924 102-4 (1980).
4. RUIZ. supra note 3, at 60.
5. STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 38 (1990).
6. JAIME SUCHLICKI, CUBA: FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO 82-83 (2d ed., rev. 1986).

7. Id. at 83.
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affected the Dominican Republic's independence. Overseas banking interests,
in particular, controlled the Dominican economy which accommodated
American sugar interests.
II. NEOCOLONIALISM, MAJOR LEAGUE-STYLE

Within this neocolonialist environment, professional baseball
organizations from the United States had taken notice of the resources in Latin
America by the first decade of the twentieth century. Part of the reason for
this interest was that nineteenth century laissez-fairebusiness practices were
still viable there. Labor relations with management were loosely defined and
scarcely regulated. Child labor laws were virtually non-existent. And, there
was a plethora of recruits eager to enter the professional baseball labor force.
Latin baseball players also had much in common with their counterparts
in the agrarian and urban industrial sectors. MLB teams treated Latin
American baseball players like commodities and gave little attention to
helping the often star-struck recruits adjust to North American culture.
Largely impoverished, but full of youthful vigor, the growing number of Latin
American baseball players buoyed their spirits with the hope that big-league
opportunities lay just around the corner. But their aspirations, as they
eventually learned, were no match for the shrewd and experienced MLB
scouts, whose affiliations with major league clubs gave them the leverage they
needed to attract young Latin players for little or no cost. Contracts were
loosely structured and often carried little legitimate weight. Remarkably, this
exploitative process was started by a person whose legacy is that of a great
humanitarian-Branch Rickey.
Branch Rickey, of course, gained his greatest fame for his efforts to
integrate the major leagues racially. But the enterprising administrator also
spearheaded a philosophy that became the standard by which Latin players
would be recruited, a process that played a significant role as MLB teams
extended their recruitment efforts deeper into Latin America. Characterized
by Kevin Kerrane as a "manipulative" operator, Rickey introduced the use of
non-binding agreements, which he called "desk contracts." 8 Rickey taught his
8. KE ViN KERRANE, DOLLAR SIGN ONTHE MUSCLE: THE WORLDOF BASEBALL SCOUTING 27 (1989).
Panof Rickey's influence came from the legendary St. Louis Cardinals' scout Charlie Barrett whom Rickey
once asserted ."could assay the gold content in a handful of ore."' Id. at 23.
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scouts the art of "signing thousands of amateurs on a purely tentative basis."9
Utilizing this "quality out of quantity" principle, players, upon being signed,
were sent to various outposts where they were "scouted at [a] greater leisure,
and, perhaps ... released a few weeks later without money for transportation
home."' 0
Clyde Slapnicka also used similar tactics during his reign as scout and
general manager for the Cleveland Indians in the late 1930s. The art of
"cutting corners" and manipulating contracts was the rule of thumb in the
Slapnicka era. While this approach greatly benefitted MLB teams, players
were, unfortunately, often plunged into limbo and left holding contracts that
were frequently undated, non-binding, and useless.
By the late 1930s, scouts from many MLB teams modeled signing
techniques on the Rickey and Slapnicka approach. Looking to gain an edge
on competitors, scouts competed fiercely with each other to sign Latin
American talent. Additionally, North American blue -chip players were often
costly and, worse yet, apt to bargain their services with competing scouts.
Hence, the inexperienced and unheralded scout continually faced uphill battles
to win American players for his ball club. Joe Cambria was originally one of
the "ivory hunters" who struggled to sign players in North America.
Frustrated by his campaigns in the United States, Cambria turned his attention
to Latin America where he eventually made his mark.
By the end of the 1930s, the appearance of Latin players on MLB rosters
had already taken place. Since Esteban Bellan's inclusion on the Troy
Haymakers of the American Association in 1871, -players from Latin
American countries had sporadically played American professional baseball.
All, except for Colombian Louis Castro in 1902, had been from Cuba. And
all were considered to be white. But only one, Adolfo Luque, became a star.
In a career that spanned from 1914 to 1935, Luque won 194 games, claimed
a World Series victory, and, in 1923, led all National League pitchers with a
microscopic 1.93 earned run average. But aside from Luque, other Latinos
received little notoriety. Generally, the attention directed toward them
centered on cultural and comical stereotypes. The phonetic spelling of their
broken English commonly appeared in the sports pages. And one, "Good
Field; No Hit,"-a phraseology reportedly delivered by Cuban catcher Mike
9. Id.
10. Id. at 27.

200

'LATIN PLAYERS ON THE CHEAP'

Gonzalez in his description of a potential Latin recruit-became the caricature
of Latin players who came into American professional baseball. Although
many Latins performed admirably against big leaguers in the United States
and the Caribbean, they were regarded by scouts or MLB teams as no more
than cheap, disposable players."
Clark Griffith, however, was not entirely sold on these common
perceptions of Latin players. In 1911, Griffith recruited two Cubans,
Armando Marsans and Rafael Almeida, to play for his club. After the 1912
season, Griffith left Cincinnati for Washington where he managed and
eventually came to own the Senators. As an owner, Griffith unfortunately had
a difficult time fielding competitive teams. Moreover, his tight budget hurt his
ability to recruit top American players. Recalling his earlier experience with
Latin players, the Senators' chief again opted to see what type of talent might
be recruited in the Pearl of the Antilles.
By 1930, Cuba had truly become baseball's Caribbean "epicenter" with
a long and noble baseball past that was nearly as extensive as that of its
northern neighbor. By 1900, for instance, professional baseball already
existed on the island. Although there was ample competition at home, Cuban
interest in MLB grew. For a number of Cuban players, the lure of greater
fame and fortune, as well as the opportunity to compete against legendary
Norte Americanos, proved to be a magnet much too powerful to resist. And
Joe Cambria, many Cuban players were convinced, was the man who could
take them north.
When Clark Griffith crossed his path in 1930, Cambria, a businessman of
Italian extraction, operated both a Laundromat and semi-professional baseball
team. Cambria remained in baseball thereafter, largely in the capacity of a
scout. Even during his earliest years in American professional baseball,
Cambria's recruitment tactics earned him the unwanted attention of
Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis. The exceedingly rigid Landis
viewed Cambria's habit of utilizing loosely structured contracts as a violation
of professional baseball rules and moved to have Cambria removed from the
game. Griffith came to Cambria's rescue and convinced Landis only to issue
Cambria a warning. In 1932, Griffith hired Cambria to be a full-time scout for
the Washington Senators. Within the next few years, Cambria recruited such
II. SAMUEL 0. REGALADO, VIVA BASEBALL!: LATIN MAJOR LEAGUERS AND THEIR SPECIAL HUNGER
39(1998).
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stars as Mickey Vernon, George Case, and future Hall of Famer Early Wynn.
But these findings were few and far between. Given his limited abilities
relative to other seasoned scouts, and the burden of Griffith's tight wallet,
Cambria viewed Cuba as an answer to his problems.
In a day and age that predated provisions to prevent the exploitation of
Latin youth, Cambria implanted himself in a baseball-crazed environment that
welcomed his presence. "I heard that Cubans were a deeply religious people,"
wrote reporter Sam Lacy in 1947, "[i]n two days here [in Cuba] I have learned
that baseball is their religion."' 2 Since the initial appearance of baseball on
the island in the 1870s, the game spread like wildfire. Within a few years,
several teams formed and competition throughout the country grew more
organized. Moreover, as Cubans struggled to win their freedom from Spain,
baseball was among the important elements that Cubans identified as being
distinctly American. In fact, proceeds from games were often turned over to
the rebels who were fighting for independence. 3 By the turn of the century,
Cuba's romance with baseball was evident in the game's appearance in
literature and poetry.14
Exposure to the North American Major Leagues also advanced the
Cubans' hunger for the sport. By the end of the 1920s, MLB clubs routinely
toured Cuba searching for additional training, competition, and finances. The
high salaries and impressive skills of big-name players further whetted the
baseball appetites of young Cuban boys. At the beginning of the 1930s, the
already large gap between the haves and have nots, compounded by a
depressed economy, produced great poverty, particularly among the rural
population and blacks. It was in this environment that Joe Cambria made his
initial appearance.
Described by Cuban baseball chronicler Roberto GonzAlez Echevarria as
a "cagey man,' Cambria set up shop in Havana and directed a "network of
bird dogs who scouted for him in the Cuban bushes."' 6 From the late 1930s
to the mid-1950s, Cambria monopolized Cuban players for the Washington
12. KERRANE, supra note 8, at 6.
13. ROBERTO GONZALEZ ECHEVARRIA, THE PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL 83
(1999).
14. See id. at 75-11l. Gonz7lez Echevarria's Chapter Four, "A Cuban Belle Epoque," provides an
excellent analysis of the relationship between Cuban baseball and its culture during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.
15. Id. at 269.
16. Id.
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Senators. Though he reportedly signed some 400 players-including such
notables as Roberto Estalella, Camilo Pascual, Pedro Ramos, and Carlos
Paula-many did not come close to reaching the big leagues. Many did not
even leave the island. Despite Cambria's exploitative techniques, Cubans
welcomed Cambria's presence. But the manipulative scout also took
advantage of his circumstances. The profits he accumulated from the quantity
of players he signed gave him a virtual carte blanche to use whatever tactics
he chose. His success with this method also led him to boast that he could
sign players to less bonus money "than you would pay for a hat." "In Cuba,"
Kerrane claimed, "Cambria didn't even bother with the hat."' 7
Not only did Cambria sign many players with little or no hope of reaching
the majors, those that did make it to the United States received no orientation
to adapt and succeed in this country. Cambria's program did not escape the
attention of Bob Considine, an American sportswriter who sarcastically
referred to Cambria as an "ivory hunter." Writing for the Washington Post,
Considine criticized Cambria for inadequately preparing the raw recruits for
what they would experience in the major leagues.' 8 When Cuban players
faced a constant barrage of insults, bench-jockeying, and discriminatory
attitudes, they played and lived in an environment in which satisfactory
performance was exceedingly difficult. Moreover, the devastating language
barrier aggravated these problems.
Years later, however, some Cambria defenders emerged. Ralph Avila, a
former Latin American scouting supervisor for the Los Angeles Dodgers,
praised the legendary scout: "A lot of people resented Cambria because he
signed so many players for the Griffiths and so many got released. But I
don't. He gave opportunity to a lot of my people that no one else was willing
to give."' 9
During the 1950s, Howie Haak, following in Cambria's footsteps, gained
notoriety in the Caribbean region. Employed by the Pittsburgh Pirates, Haak
spearheaded the club's Latin American scouting program. Unlike Cambria,
however, Haak did not venture into the Caribbean on his own. His travels in
17. KERRANE, supra note 8, at 30.
18. GONZALEZ ECHEVARRiA, supra note 13, at 270. (Considine "reported how badly the Cuban
players fared with the Senators, where they were paid meager salaries and were the victims of the sort of
prejudice Jackie Robinson would have to endure a few years later.").
19.

MICHAEL M. OLEKSAK & MARY ADAMS OLEKSAK, BtISBOL: LATIN AMERICANS AND THEGRAND

OLD GAME 45 (1991).
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the Caribbean came after Roberto Clemente's appearance on the Pirates'
scene. In 1954, Clemente was languishing in the Los Angeles Dodgers farm
system. The Pirates, who finished in the National League cellar in 1953,
received the rights to Roberto Clemente in 1954. Branch Rickey, who by then
was the Pirates' club president, went to view his new acquisition the following
spring. Clemente dazzled the mahatma. In the midst of a long-term plan to
rebuild the Pirates, Rickey immediately saw the potential value in a Latin
American market and beckoned Howie Haak: "If there's anymore of those
'creatures' down there," he told the scout, "I want 'em!, 21
For the next several years, Haak traveled extensively throughout the
region and challenged Cambria's hold on the territory. Like the Senators'
scout, he found many young players who begged for the opportunity to play
in the United States. Indeed, after his first full year of Latin scouting, he
boasted that he had signed "four gems for about a thousand dollars of bonus
money-total.... To get four guys- that good in the states might've cost a
hundred thousand."'" In accord with Rickey's "quality out of quantity"
philosophy, Haak routinely held tryout sessions and signed several players at
the same time. "[A scout] could go down and take his pick and say 'well,
we'll save this bunch for next year,"' remembered scout George Genovese, a
Haak contemporary who worked in Mexico.22
Despite the embellishments of the big-league scouts in Latin America,
bonuses were few and far between and moderate, at best. Felipe Alou signed
for a $200 bonus, Juan Marichal and Orlando Cepeda each signed for $500,
and Roberto Clemente received a remarkable $10,000. Nevertheless, these
cases were rare. Most players signed contracts that merely paid for their
passage to the United States. "Bonus? Sure, we all get bonus," remembered
the late Zoilo Versailles, who, in 1965, became the first Latino to win
American League Most Valuable Player, "You know the bonus we get?
Carfare, that's the bonus. 2 3
The contract itself was a euphemism. Joe Cambria, for instance, simply
held onto contracts until he deemed players ready to move on or move out.
And the players, many desperate, had little recourse. Additionally, by signing
20. REGALADO, supra note I1,at 57.
21. Ross Newhan, Howie Haak: The King of the Card bean, in BILL MAZEROSKI'S BASEBALL: THE
OFFICIAL YEARBOOK OF THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ALUMNI ASSOCIATION 10-11 (1990).
22. REGALADO, supranote 11, at 58.

23. Id. at 60.
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under these circumstances, the players forfeited their opportunity to play in
prestigious amateur leagues and, thus, were unable to market their talents to
other teams. In effect, the players became chattels for Cambria and his
contemporaries.
Hunger and poverty accentuated the Latin Americans' desire to play
professional baseball. Felipe Alou, who was only seventeen when he signed
with the then New York Giants, recalled that as he signed his contract in his
small house, "I looked at the tired walls of our home, at the crowded rooms,
at the weariness in my parents' faces .... I could only hope that better days
were coming and that I would help bring them."2 4
Age restrictions, too, were loosely obeyed. Anxious to offset competition,
consideration of youth in a period that well predated "rights of child"
mandates was not a factor in the recruitment process. Scouts frequently
viewed the signing of exceedingly young players as a badge of honor. "[At
that time] you could still sign 'em real young. I got Tony Pefia when he was
16, [Omar] Moreno when he was 16, and I could have had Juan Marichal
when he was 16," remembered Howie Haak.2 5
Haak, of course, was not alone. The practice of signing players younger
than seventeen continued unregulated by MLB into the 1980s. Moreover,
former Latin players themselves were, at times, parties to these signings. In
the mid- 1970s, Ruben Amaro, a former big -leaguer turned scout, signed Jorge
Lebrun of Puerto Rico to a contract with the Philadelphia Phillies for a large
bonus of $38,000. Lebrun was fourteen years old. Jubilant at the time of the
signing, Amaro recalled an episode which greatly tempered his joy. "One day
he was supposed to go to a workout at the ballpark, but [instead] asked me
'May I stay in the backyard and keep on playing with Ruben and David?' My
two sons were ten and twelve [and] all three were playing tag," said the
surprised scout.26 Lebrun's career never developed; and, shortly after he
turned eighteen, the Phillies released him. Other signings like Lebrun's,
however, also occurred. Julio Franco signed a Phillies contract at age sixteen,
and Orlando Isales signed at fifteen. Still, Amaro viewed these early-aged
signings in the spirit of competitiveness. "[A] lot of Latin players mature

24. FELIPE ALOU & HERPM WEISKOPF, FELIPE ALOU: MY LIFE AND BASEBALL 21 (1967).
25. KERRANE, supranote 8, at 101.

26. Id. at 313.
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early, and if you wait too long you can lose them to other scouts," he
claimed. 7
By the end of the decade and into the 1980s, other scouting techniques
also raised eyebrows. The "quality in quantity" principle remained in order
as baseball's activities in Latin America entered the age of the academy.
Somewhat akin to the School of the Americas in Panama, where U.S. army
personnel trained Latin American officers in the art of counterinsurgency
warfare, the academies were, in theory, designed to provide young hopefuls
both game training and orientation to North American culture. But, in some
cases, they proved to be holding centers in which clubs could protect their
investments.
So adamant were the organizations in this quest that, as
anthropologist Alan Klein learned, there existed cases where scouts virtually
kidnapped players to prevent interlopers from interfering with their catches.
As related to Klein, Papi Bisono, a former Dominican baseball commissioner,
claimed that the baseball academies acted as "hideouts because the scouts
didn't want their kids seen by other scouts. It almost seemed like they were
concentration camps. 2 8
The perceived prestige that came along with the title "academy" also
masked the financial discrepancies between what clubs spent on Latin recruits
compared to their North American counterparts. According to Kevin
Kerrane's study, in the 1975 June draft, MLB clubs paid on average $60,000
to players from the United States while Latino signees received a paltry
$5,000.9 Six years later, the Philadelphia Phillies revealed that Players
Development funding for North American players was $355,000 compared to
30
$25,000 for Latin American recruits.
In fairness, however, some of the baseball academies did introduce young
players to North American cuisine, social culture, and, most importantly, the
English language. The number of Spanish-speaking agents also increased by
the 1980s. To some extent, the appearance of agents and representatives,
though their numbers were small, helped level the playing field for
determining compensation. Moreover, the growth of the U.S. Spanish-

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 314.
ALAN M. KLEIN, SUGARBALL: THE AMERICAN GAME, THE DOMINICAN DREAM 54 (1991).
KERRANE, supra note 8, at 313.
Id. at311.
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language media, the influence of Hispanics in state and local government, and
the tremendous success of players such as Fernando Valenzuela in the 1980s
and Sammy Sosa in the 1990s, have helped magnify both the achievements
and plight of Latin American players.

CONCLUSION

But the neocolonialist tradition is not easily overcome. Baseball's
historical treatment of Latin baseball hopefuls was grounded in the tradition
of American exploitation of Latin labor dating back to the nineteenth century.
Indeed, MLB followed in the footsteps of such enterprises as Standard Oil
Company in Mexico prior to 1938 or the United Fruit Company in Guatemala
from 1900 to the 1950s-companies that paid meager wages and monopolized
the work force. Indeed, even in the United States, Latin labor exploitation, as
seen in the controversial Bracero Program from 1942 to 1964, was not
uncommon. That MLB clubs conducted their business in the same manner
was in keeping with American historic business practices on foreign soil.
American baseball activities since the Cambria period have also been dubious,
at best. Efforts to curb MLB scouting abuses emerged, such as Dominican
President High Blancos' 1984 Presidential Decree regulating MLB academies
in his country and MLB's 1984 enactment of the seventeen-year old rule.
MLB clubs still, however, sought and continue to seek ways to side-step these
guidelines. In short, MLB teams had recruitment guidelines," but they rarely
pressed their scouts in Latin America to put them into practice. Moreover,
the financial playing field between American and Latin talent was anything
but level.
In his multi-volume study An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal,
concluded, that the exploitive nature of American capitalism contributed
directly to the racial discrepancy between whites and blacks.32 The principles
of Myrdal's conclusions also apply to MLB's relationship with its Latin
31. Angel Vargas, The Globalization ofBaseball: A Latin American Perspective, 8 IND. J.GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 21,26 (2000). See also Arturo J.Marcano & David P.Fidler, The Globalization ofBaseball:
Major League Baseball and the Mistreatment of Latin American Baseball Talent, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 511 (1999) (on continuing MLB abuses in Latin America).
32.
(1944).

GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THENEGROPROBLEM AND MODERN AMERICA 208
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constituency. MLB's actions have been a microcosm of America's historic
attitudes towards its southern neighbors. The MLB practice of signing young
Latin players "on the cheap" was and is not a new development. It was, and
remains, part of the American neocolonialist tradition.

